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NOTES
ADMIRALTY CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER PARTITION OF VESSELS.
Madruga v. Superior Court' is noteworthy in that for the first time the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, with the federal courts, over actions for partition of vessels by sale.
The action was brought in the Superior Court of California in and for San
Diego County, as San Diego was the home port of the vessel. There had been a
dispute as to the vessel's employment. Co-owners representing an 85 per cent
interest in the ship filed the complaint, asking for partition under the authority
of the Code of Civil Procedure 852a, 2 which permits an action for partition of
personal property
The demurrer of the defendant minority owner, on the ground that the federal
district courts had exclusive jurisdiction, was overruled. The defendant then applied for a writ of prohibition directing the Superior Court to refrain from further
proceedings. The Supreme Court of California discharged the writ, upholding the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court.3 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.4
In affirming the holding of the California court the Supreme Court disposed
of two issues. Namely, the extent and the character of federal admirality jurisdiction.
Unless the federal courts have jurisdiction to order ships sold for partition of
the proceeds the case presents no problem. Oddly enough the question has never
been squarely decided by the Supreme Court. The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime junsdiction." 5 In the first Judiciary Act, Congrss provided that the United States district
courts were to have "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." 6 Mr. Justice Black for the court discussed the conflict of authority in the lower federal courts. These diverse holdings have ranged
from the view that neither majority nor minority interests should be granted partition, 7 only equal interests,S to decisions that either can obtain partition on a
proper showing.9 Without arguing the point, the court concluded "that the power
of admiralty, as Congress and the courts have developed it over the years, is broad
enough for United States district courts to order vessels sold for partition." 10
This conclusion is in itself an important clarification of admiralty law, even though
it leaves open the question of who is entitled to partition.
1346 U.S. 556 (1954).
2 CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoC. 852a et seq. § 852 deals with partition of real property, and § 852a
merely provides that the following section govern partition of personal property "when applicable."
340 Cal.2d 65, 251 P.2d 1 (1952).
4345 U.S. 963 (1952).

r U. S. CONST. Art. III § 2.
6 1 STAT. 73, 77 (1789).
7 Lewis v. Kinney, Fed. Cas. No. 8,325 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1879), The Red Wing, 10 F.2d 389
(S.D. Cal. 1925).

8
9

The Emma B., 140 Fed. 771 (D.C.D. N.J. 1906).

Tunno v. The Belsina, Fed. Cas. No 14,236 (D.C.D.S.C. 1857), and see Comment,
43 GA. L.J. 534 for a discussion of the state decisions, including the Madruga case.
10346 U.S. 556 (1952).
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The court went on to consider the contention that federal admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive. The Judiciary Act, after granting district courts their exclusive
original cognizance, added a "saving clause," which reads: "
saving to suitors,
in all cases, the right to a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."" The clause has been amended to read: "saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."' 12 The court said
that this change is no way narrowed the jurisdiction of the state courts under the
original 1789 Act; so the issue was considered as if no amendment had been made.
The saving clause seems inconsistent with the exclusive grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal district courts. However, the clause has a long history
of interpretation.' 3 The court restated this interpretation as follows: "Admiralty's
jurisdiction is 'exclusive' only as to those maritime causes of action begun and
carned on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated
as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce
a lien."' 14 State courts are left "competent" to adjudicate maritime causes of action
in proceedings in personam. The court also cited Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Co.,"5 which held that a state, though it could not provide a remedy in rem for a
maritime cause of action, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them
such incidents, as it sees fit, so long as it does not make changes in the "substantive maritime law."
The reasoning of the court was that the California proceedings were not in
rem "in the admiralty sense." It said that Manuel Madruga and not the ship was
made defendant, and that the California court acted only upon the interest of the
parties under its in personam jurisdiction. Therefore an adjudication would not
affect the interests of others in the world at large, as it would if it had been a
proceeding in rem to enforce a lien. So the court concluded that the California
court was competent to grant partition and therefore had jurisdiction of the subject matter.
This holding disposed of the case, but the court went on to discuss the problem of a federal partition rule binding upon all the states. It denied that such a
rule existed, as the petitioner claimed, limiting the exercise of admiralty's power
to partition between owners of equal interests, or of any other national rule. The
court did not think that, considering the scarcity of cases, a judicial establishment
of some national rule was warranted, since Congress had not seen fit to legislate
on the subject. The court further observed that these "essentially local disputes"
could best be handled by "easily accessible local courts."
The decision is not free from difficulty.-It is too late to quarrel with the interpretation of the saving clause. But the basis for labeling the California proceeding
an in personam action is not clear. Mr. Justice Frankfurter attacks the majority
position on this point. He points out that the right asserted was in the ship, not
a personal claim outside the ship. He feels that jurisdiction should not depend on
the "tenuous formality" that California procedure requires the co-owner to be
made defendant, rather than the ship itself. Frankfurter adopts the reasoning of
111 STAT. 73, 77. It is to be noted that the California Supreme Court in the Madruga case
rested its decision chiefly on the saving clause as amended.
12 Revisions of 28 U.S.C. 1333, 28 U.S.C.A. 1333, 1948 and 1949.
13The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866), The Hine v. Travor, ,71 U.S. 555 (1866),
The Belfast, 74 U.S. 624 (1868).
14 See note 10 supra.
15264 U.S. 108 (1923).
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Fischer v. Carey,16 an earlier California case which the Madruga case did not
overrule, that it is a fundamental part of admiralty jurisdiction to exercise control
over the res, the ship itself.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter is undoubtedly correct in saying that the usual in rem
action asserts a right in a thing rather than against a person, and is equally correct
in asserting that admiralty exercises control over the res. We can agree that if the
partitioning court takes control and sells the vessel its action looks like an in rem
proceeding, whoever is named defendant. But Frankfurter's broad objection is
avoided by the majority's statement of the well settled narrower conception of an
admiralty in rem action, the mark of which is that the decree "binds the world."
That is, because the decree is founded on dominion over the res, as the actual subject matter of the jurisdiction, the decree binds not only the parties before the
court, but all who have any interest in the vessel.17 Under the decree the property
itself passes, and not merely the title and interest of a personal defendant.' A sale
under the decree in rem is a complete divestiture of prior liens and conveys to the
purchaser a free and unencumbered title, the holders of such liens being remitted
to the funds which are substituted for the vessel.' 9
The real drawback to the decision would not seem to be the one Mr. Justice
Frankfurter voices, but the fact that California is a code state. As Mr. Justice Field
pointed out in The Moses Taylor,20 under a sale upon a judgment in a common law
proceeding, the title acquired can never be better than that possessed by the personal defendant. But what is the situation in California? The code sections are
not without ambiguity There is no definite indication which sections apply where
personal property is to be partitioned, and no personal property cases could be
found where the sections were cited. However, the relevant sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure provide: 21 (§ 757) for service of the complaint by
publication if a party having a share or interest is unknown; (§ 766) that judgment must be rendered that such partition be effectual forever, which judgment is
binding and conclusive on the parties to the suit, and "on all persons interested in
the property, who may be unknown, to whom notice has been given of the action
for partition by publication," and on all other persons claiming from such parties
or persons; and (§ 771) that the proceeds of the sale of encumbered property must
be applied under the direction of the court "3. to satisfy and cancel of record the
several liens in the order of their priority, if entitled to priority over the lien under
which the owner's title was obtained." In addition, 787 provides that a recorded
"conveyance" shall be a bar against all parties and persons interested, including
unknown persons served by publication, and against all persons having unrecorded
deeds or liens (such persons need not be made parties).
It would seem that the effect of these sections could be a judgment that would
bind the world, especially if the plaintiff took the precaution of publishing notice
of the suit. It is true that this would not be the result in every case; it would not
be the result if the owner's interest were mortgaged heavily or if the value of the
16173 Cal. 185, 159 Pac. 577 (1916).
17The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866), The Belfast, 74 U.S. 624 (1868), Knapp v.
McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
Is Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry, 237 U.S. 303 (1915).
19 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY
2

17, 20, 21.

o The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866).
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